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Abstract. - In this Letter, we introduce an aspiration-induced reconnection mechanism into the
spatial public goods game. A player will reconnect to a randomly chosen player if its payoff
acquired from the group centered on the neighbor does not exceed the aspiration level. We find
that an intermediate aspiration level can best promote cooperation. This optimal phenomenon can
be explained by a negative feedback effect, namely, a moderate level of reconnection induced by the
intermediate aspiration level induces can change the downfall of cooperators, and then facilitate the
fast spreading of cooperation. While insufficient reconnection and excessive reconnection induced
by low and high aspiration levels respectively are not conductive to such an effect. Moreover, we
find that the intermediate aspiration level can lead to the heterogeneous distribution of degree,
which will be beneficial to the evolution of cooperation.
Introduction. – Cooperation is ubiquitous in biolog-
ical and social systems, yet, understanding the emergence
and maintenance of cooperative behaviors is still a major
challenge [1]. In order to resolve this puzzle, evolution-
ary game theory provides a fruitful framework to address
the evolution of cooperation among unrelated individuals
[2, 3]. For example, the prisoner’s dilemma game [4, 5],
the snowdrift game [4, 6] and the stag-hunt game [7, 8]
have been intensively studied as the paradigms to investi-
gate cooperative behaviors through pairwise interactions.
However, some social dilemmas involve larger groups of
interactional individuals, as can be observed by these phe-
nomena: resource distribution and redistribution, preda-
tor inspection behavior, alarm calls, and group defense,
health insurance, public transportation and environmen-
tal issues. In such cases, public goods game rather than
the game of pairwise interactions seems suited to provide
reasonable explanation for the facilitation of cooperation
[9–19].
In the original public goods game consisting of N play-
ers, each player can decide whether to contribute an
amount c to the common pool (cooperation) or not (defec-
tion). Whereafter, the overall contributions are multiplied
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by a multiplication factor r, and then are redistributed
equally among all the players, irrespective of their initial
contributions to the common pool [17]. It’s obvious that
selfish players are enforced upon to select defection, which
can take advantage of the public goods. In the traditional
game theory, players are perfectly rational, thus defection
becomes the dominant strategy leading to the deteriora-
tion of cooperation, which is known as the Tragedy of the
Commons [20, 21].
Over the past decades, a number of theoretical and ex-
perimental evidences have been proposed and investigated
to understand the emergence of cooperation. Remarkable
mechanisms include kin selection [22], direct and indirect
reciprocity [23,24], punishment and reward [25,26], hetero-
geneous activity [16], group selection [27], voluntary par-
ticipation [9,10,13], spatial effects [10,28,29], image score
effect [30, 31], success-driven migration [32], to name but
a few. Importantly, apart from the considerable attention
paid to the facilitation mechanisms alone, the coevolu-
tionary game also attracts great interest [33–45]. Since it
not only reflects the evolving of strategies over time, but
also characterizes the adaptive development of the net-
work topologies or the update rules (for a further review
see [33]). For instance, in [34–36] the rewiring of existing
links was recognized as very beneficial to the evolution
of cooperation, the growth of a network had a positive
p-1
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Fig. 1: ((Color online) Fraction of cooperators ρc in depen-
dence on the multiplication factor r for different values of aspi-
ration level E. Note that intermediate value of E can sustain
cooperation better than lower or larger case.
impact on the evolution of cooperation in [41–43], and co-
operation could also be promoted when the coevolution of
strategies and update rules were considered [44,45]. Take
some multinational corporations as examples, these cor-
porations often extend their business to different countries
or regions to pursue their maximal profit. However, once
the profit gained from a country or region is undesirable,
they will withdraw the investment partially or entirely,
and then transfer it to other countries or regions. Inspired
by these actual phenomena and the plentiful achievements
of coevolutionary, in the Letter, we propose an aspiration-
induced reconnection mechanism to study the emergence
of cooperation in the public goods game. In the game, if
player’s payoff obtained from the group centered on one
of its neighbors does not exceed the aspiration level, the
player will cut the link with the neighbor and rewire the
link to one randomly selected player. Interestingly, we find
that such a simple but meaningful approach can promote
the level of cooperation best under a moderate aspiration
level, while it is not conductive to facilitate cooperation
for too low or too high aspiration levels. We give an inter-
pretation to these observed phenomena by inspecting the
process of evolution and investigating the degree distribu-
tion of the evolved network. Moreover, we examine the
universality of such a mechanism through the variation of
game model.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Sec. II, we will first describe the model of considered evo-
lutionary game. Then we present the main results and
discussions in Sec. III. Finally, we will summarize the
conclusion in Sec. IV.
Evolutionary game. – We consider the public goods
game with players located on the nodes of the spatial net-
work. According to Ref. [18], each individual i participates
in interactions in ki+1 neighborhoods that center about i
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Fig. 2: (Color online) Fraction of cooperators ρc in dependence
on aspiration level E for different values of multiplication fac-
tors r. Note that for r ≤ 6.5 (a), it can be obviously observed
that there exists an intermediate aspiration level E for which
the evolution of cooperation is optimal; while for r ≥ 7 (b),
this peak is not distinct as the above case because of the fact
that large r can promote cooperation better, even though the
invariance of network.
and its ki neighbors, where each neighborhood contains a
central node and all nodes that are directly connected to
it. Each cooperator contributes a total cost c = 1 shared
equally among all the neighborhoods that it engages. The
strategy is sx = 1 for a C player and sx = 0 otherwise.
The payoff of the individual x with strategy sx associated
with the neighborhood centered at an individual y is given
by
px,y =
r
ky + 1
ky∑
i=0
si
ki + 1
−
sx
kx + 1
, (1)
where i = 0 represents y, si is the strategy of the neighbors
i of y, and ki is its degree. The total payoff of player x is
Px =
∑
y∈Λx
px,y, (2)
where Λx is the neighborhood of x and itself [17].
As the interaction network, we use a Newman-Watts
small world network, where a number of long-range links
Nadd are randomly added to the two-dimensional lattice
with periodic boundary conditions [46]. Initially, each
player is designed to be either a cooperator or defector
with equal probability. Players asynchronously update
their strategies in a random sequential order. Before up-
dating strategy, the randomly selected player x evaluates
the payoff px,y from the neighborhood centered on y ac-
cording to Eq. (1). If the payoff px,y cannot satisfy the
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aspiration level E (E is uniform for all the players), player
x will remove the link with neighbor y, and then cre-
ate a new link to a randomly chosen non-neighbor node
from network (i.e., multiple links are prohibited.) In our
model, we assume that the local interactions with four
nearest neighbor nodes (the von Neumann neighborhood)
do not engage in the reconnection behaviors. It is because
that these local interactions are determined by the spatial
neighborhoods, and they are reasonably assumed to be
fixed during the whole process [37]. After rewiring, player
x collects its total payoff according to Eq. (2), then all
the neighbors of player x acquire their payoffs by means
of the same way as player x.
Lastly, the player x will randomly select one of its
neighbors z and adopts z’s strategy with a probability
W (sz → sx) depending on the payoff difference. Namely
W (sz → sx) =
1
1 + exp[(Px − Pz)/K]
, (3)
where K denotes the amplitude of noise or its inverse
(1/K), the so-called intensity of selection [47]. In the limit
K → 0, the strategy of neighbor y is always adopted pro-
vided that Py > Px. While in the limit K → ∞ all infor-
mation is lost, that is, player x switches to the strategy of
neighbor y by tossing a coin. Furthermore, it should be
noted that this update rule is the sequential version of the
Fermi rule, at variance with some other works in which
updates are made in parallel [17,19]. Since the effect of K
on the evolution of cooperation has been studied in detail
in Refs. [19, 48, 49], we simply set the value of K to be
K = 0.1.
Results and discussions. – Results of Monte Carlo
simulations presented below are obtained on a Newman-
Watts small world network hosting N = 2500 players with
average degree 〈k〉 = 8, namely, the number of long-range
links is Nadd = 2N (By extensive simulations, we find our
results are robust to the network sizes and the average de-
grees.). On average, in each Monte Carlo step (MCS), all
players have the chances of rewiring and updating their
strategies. The key quantity for characterizing the coop-
erative behavior is the fraction of cooperators ρc, which is
gained by averaging 2000 full steps after a transient time
of 10000 generations in our work. Moreover, since the
process of rewiring may yield heterogeneous distribution
of links, which will seriously affects the accuracy of simu-
lations. Therefore, the final results are averaged over 40
independent runs for each parameter value.
Figure 1 shows the fraction of cooperators ρc as a func-
tion of the multiplication factor r for different aspiration
levels E. One can see that, for E = 0.0 or E = 0.2,
the cooperative phenomenon can be flourished even when
r ≤ 5.5 (especially, for the case of E = 0.2, ρ = 1 when
r = 5.5), yet for E = −0.2 or E = 0.4, cooperative phe-
nomenon appears only for r ≥ 6. These results suggest
that there may exist an intermediate aspiration level E,
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Fig. 3: (Color online) Time courses depicting the number of re-
connections Nr and the fraction of cooperators ρc for different
values of E. Note in (a), the number of reconnections will in-
crease at first for intermediate and large aspiration levels, but
develops into different patterns finally. While for small aspira-
tion level, the number of reconnections will keep constant. For
the evolution of cooperation in (b), the intermediate aspiration
level will go through a negative feedback effect to promoting co-
operation, which corresponds to a peak of reconnections, while
small and large aspiration levels can not avoid the destiny of
cooperation dying out. All the results are obtained for r = 6.0.
which induces the optimal cooperation. To examine the
effect of E on the evolution of cooperation more precisely,
we present ρc in dependence on the aspiration level E for
different values of r in Fig. 2. As shown in Fig. 2(a),
the impact of small E on cooperation remains marginal,
and thus most cooperators could not resist the exploita-
tion against defectors or only a small fraction of coopera-
tors could survive. However, as aspiration level E reaches
an intermediate value, a remarkable increase of cooper-
ation can be observed. By further increasing the aspi-
ration level, the facilitation effect is deteriorated again.
These results favor that the intermediate aspiration level
can warrant an optimal promotion of cooperation, which
is analogous to the so-called coherence resonance [50, 51].
For large r (i.e., r ≥ 7), as shown in Fig. 2(b), the non-
monotonic phenomenon is not so distinct as the case of
small r. This is actually what one would expect, because,
compared with small r where the sum of cooperators is
very limited or zero, large r can make sure of generating
more rewards for the cooperation, even though the net-
work does not evolve.
In order to understand the nontrivial effect of aspira-
tion level on the fraction of cooperators, we study the
time courses of reconnection number Nr and the fraction
of cooperators ρc for different values of E in Fig. 3. For
p-3
Haifeng Zhang et al.
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
5 10 15 20 25
1E-4
1E-3
0.01
0.1
 
 
P(
k)
k
 E=-0.1
 E=0.1
 E=0.3
 
 
P(
k)
k
Fig. 4: (Color online) Degree distributions P (k) of networks
for different aspiration levels E in the final steady states. Note
that small and large aspiration levels will not alter the initial
norm distribution with 〈k〉 = 8, while intermediate aspiration
level induces an explicit heterogeneous distribution that is more
beneficial for the evolution of cooperation (see also the inset
for E = 0.1). All the results are obtained as averages over 50
independent realizations for r = 6.0.
E = −0.1, Figure 3(a) illustrates that due to the fact that
individual payoffs are always higher than aspiration level,
the initial topology structure of interaction network does
not change over time, namely, the number of reconnec-
tions always equals zero. At this time, cooperators on the
initial network cannot resist the exploitation from defec-
tors, which results in the extinction of cooperation (see
Fig. 3(b)). Whereas for large aspiration level (E = 0.3),
most individuals’ payoffs are lower than the aspiration
level. As a result, reconnection behavior occurs frequently
and individuals will randomly connect to others as time
evolves. In such case, the cooperative clusters are fragile
and are easy to be destroyed by the invasion of the defec-
tors. So large aspiration level also induces the extinction
of cooperation. More significantly, we observe that the
immediate aspiration level (E = 0.1) can induce a peak
of reconnections which yet corresponds to a downside for
the evolution of cooperation. In the most early stages of
process, defection yields higher individual benefit, and the
outlook for cooperators is gloomy. With the game forward,
a few players’ payoffs could not exceed the aspiration level,
and thus a small fraction of reconnections will appear. All
the reconnections will effectively alter the evolution tide,
namely, the downfall of cooperators will transform into
the fast spreading of cooperators. Because, in such case,
only choosing cooperation adequately can exceed the as-
piration level. When cooperation becomes the dominant
strategy, individual payoffs will uniformly exceed the as-
piration level, which makes the possibility of reconnection
vanish, namely, the number of reconnections will become
zero over again. Consequently, an intermediate aspiration
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Fig. 5: (Color online) Fraction of cooperators ρc in dependence
on aspiration level E for different values of multiplication factor
r in the game where every cooperator separately contributes
a cost c = 1 to each neighborhood that it engages. Note that
the optimal promotion phenomena of cooperation are similar
to those presented in Fig. 2.
level can result in a peak of reconnections which promotes
the level of cooperation by means of a negative feedback
effect. While for low or high aspiration levels, insufficient
or excessive reconnections could not provide advantageous
conditions for such a feedback effect.
Subsequently, it remains of interest to examine the de-
gree distributions of the evolved networks for different as-
piration levels. It has been known that the heterogeneity
of host network plays an important role in the substantial
promotion of cooperation. If the hub node takes the coop-
eration (defection) strategy, its strategy will become an ex-
ample to be imitated by its neighborhood, which increases
(decreases) cooperators’ (defectors’) payoffs and results in
the great promotion of cooperation [4,17,18]. Hence, what
we would expect is to present a highly heterogeneous dis-
tribution as well. Figure 4 demonstrates clearly the de-
gree distributions in the final steady states. According to
the time courses of Nr in Fig. 3(a), we observe that the
network does not evolve with time for E = −0.1, so the
degree distribution obeys norm distribution with 〈k〉 = 8
(see Fig. 4). While for E = 0.3, long-range links which
are generated randomly and excessively make the degree
distribution confirm to the norm distribution likewise. In-
terestingly, for E = 0.1, the degree distribution deviates
from the norm distribution and the heterogeneity of net-
work is formed (see also the inset of Fig. 4 by using a
log-log representation), which is consistent with our ex-
pectation. The highly heterogeneous distribution induced
by the intermediate aspiration level is crucial for the op-
p-4
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timal promotion phenomenon of cooperation presented in
Fig. 2. Therefore, the promotion of cooperation partly at-
tributes to the potential heterogeneous states within the
network.
In the above evolutionary game, we assume that each
cooperator contributes the same total cost c = 1, which
is then shared equally among all the neighborhoods that
it engages in, namely, the individual contribution is inde-
pendent of the number of its social ties. Whereas, in the
opposite limit considered in Ref. [18], every cooperator
separately contributes a cost c = 1 to each neighborhood
that it engages. In this case, the total contribution of each
cooperator x is equal to kx + 1. Similarly as in Eq. (1),
the payoff of player x (with strategy sx) obtained from the
neighborhood centered on the player y is given by
px,y =
r
ky + 1
ky∑
i=0
si − sx. (4)
Interestingly, as shown in Fig. 5, there also exists an
intermediate aspiration level, leading to the highest coop-
eration level when r is fixed. Thus, the aspiration-induced
reconnection mechanism is robust for promoting coopera-
tion, regardless of the total contribution of cooperators.
Summary. – In summary, we have studied the effect
of the aspiration-induced reconnection on cooperation in
spatial public goods game. In the game, if player’s pay-
off acquired from the group centered on the neighbor does
not exceed aspiration level, it will remove the link with the
neighbor and reconnect it to a randomly selected player.
Through scientific simulations, we have shown that, ir-
respective of the total contribution of each cooperator,
there exists an intermediate aspiration level results in the
optimal cooperation. This optimal phenomenon can be
explained by means of a negative feedback effect. In the
early stages of evolutionary process, though cooperators
are decimated by defectors, the peak of reconnection in-
duced by the intermediate aspiration level will change the
downfall of cooperation and facilitate the fast spreading of
cooperation. While for too low or too high aspiration lev-
els, insufficient or excessive reconnections does not provide
any possibility for the emergence of such a feedback ef-
fect. Moreover, we have analyzed the degree distributions
of the network. Of particular interest is that the hetero-
geneous degree distribution induced by intermediate aspi-
ration level, warrants a potent promotion of cooperation.
Since the phenomena related with aspiration-induced re-
connection are abundant in our society, we hope that our
results can offer a new insight into understanding these
phenomena.
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